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Extant literature discusses a large number of different entry barriers that may hamper 
market efficiency or entrepreneurial activity. In practice several of these barriers 
cohere and stem from the same root. Factor analysis is used to identify the underlying 
dimensions of these barriers. 7 generic factors have been found that drive the system. 
In the literature a debate exists between scholars that stress the importance of 
structural and/or strategic barriers. This paper shows that in the perception of firms 
both types of barriers are important and argues that the effectiveness of strategic 
barriers depends on attributes of the market structure. Based on the seven generic 
factors, a conjoint analysis is carried out to identify the most important factors 
perceived by firms. The conjoint analysis shows that in particular the barriers rooted 
in three underlying dimensions require attention of market authorities as they may 
refrain new entrants from entry: finance, access to distribution channels and strategic 
action. Remarkably, government rules and regulations, product differentiation, R&D 







Small firms and in particular new firms, serve as agents of change (Audretch, 2006; 
Acs and Storey, 2004). Entries of new innovative firms foster the dynamics in the 
economy. Simultaneously, newcomers may have an equilibrating function, as firms 
will enter the market if profits are above the long-run competitive level. The upshot is 
that entry contributes to allocative as well as dynamic efficiency in the market 
(Audretch and Thurik, 2001). However, entry barriers can prevent firms from entering 
the market and hamper the process of allocative and dynamic efficiency. In line with 
this perspective it is easily understood that barriers to entry constitute an important 
issue in entrepreneurship and competition policy. In the framework of competition 
policy market authorities control the behaviour of firms in specific markets and may 
impose sanctions if market power is abused. A related issue, that may be raised in the 
framework of entrepreneurship policy, concerns the question whether entry barriers 
restrict the activities of potential entrepreneurs in the modern economy. Is it an 
incidental problem related to specific sectoral characteristics or is it a more general 
phenomenon that hampers entrepreneurial activity in the economy at large? 
 
The latter issue is relevant for policy makers as quite a body of literature shows that 
there is a positive relationship between entrepreneurial activity and national economic 
growth in developed countries (van Stel et al., 2005, Acs and Storey, 2004). In the 
Netherlands, a country neither among the laggards nor among the top dogs of 
entrepreneurial activity, this resulted in a debate among politicians and policy makers 
on policies to encourage entrepreneurship. In the debate two reasons are given to 
explain the mediocre position of the Netherlands: existing ‘entry barriers’ and/or a 
deficient ‘entrepreneurial attitude’. The first phenomenon is related to characteristics 
of the industries or a lack of servicing industries (e.g. access to credit and venture 
capital), while the second phenomenon is more related to psychological and cultural 
factors and alternative opportunities in the labour market. This paper aims at 
investigating the importance of different entry barriers in the Dutch economy. If 
vigorous barriers are detected they will at least partly account for the somewhat 
disappointing level of entrepreneurial activity in the Netherlands. 
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A large body of literature discusses a variety of entry barriers (see e.g. Shepherd, 
1997; Karakaya & Stahl, 1989). Blees et al. (2003) identified 37 barriers to entry on 
the basis of a comprehensive literature study. As some of these barriers seem to 
overlap, two questions arise. Firstly, one may question whether all these barriers are 
important. Secondly, it is interesting to verify whether these barriers are driven by a 
reduced set of underlying factors. Some research has been done in this respect 
(Karakaya, 2002; Karakaya and Stahl, 1989). A major flaw in this work is that it only 
concerns manufacturing industries (larger firms). Moreover, Karakaya (2002) mainly 
addresses structural entry barriers and is based on a relatively small number of 
observations.  
 
Several authors stress the need for empirical evidence on extant barriers to entry 
(Scherer, 1988; Geroski et al., 1990; Geroski, 1995; Bunch and Smiley, 1992; 
Karakaya, 2002). This paper addresses the firm’s perceptions with regard to entry 
barriers. Considering the difficulties of carrying out empirical research on entry 
barriers and in particular on strategic entry barriers, we decided to interview firms and 
measure their perception regarding the importance of a specific entry barrier. As our 
study is mainly interested in those barriers that refrain potential entrants to enter an 
industry, perceptions regarding entry barriers are key. Subjective opinions of business 
owners influence both growth motivation and direct behaviour (Davidsson, 1991). 
Several researchers followed the same line of thought (Bunch and Smiley, 1992; 
Singh, Utton & Waterson, 1998; Karakaya, 2002, Aidis, 2005). However, all these 
studies focused on a limited subset of entry barriers or a specific group of companies 
or industries. Some researchers stress the importance of strategic barriers (Scherer, 
1988; Bunch and Smiley, 1992), while others emphasize the role of structural barriers 
(Bain, 1956; Karakaya, 2002). In line with this a limited set of predetermined 
structural and/or strategic barriers were analyzed.  
 
For this study it was important to interview a large number of firms, representative for 
the Dutch economy, and to include all potential barriers identified in the literature 
study (Blees at al., 2003). Our sample encompasses the services and manufacturing 
sectors and involves, in line with the size distribution of firms in the economy, mainly 
SMEs. First we asked the firms to what extent the specific barriers mentioned in the 
literature occur in their markets of operation. Subsequently, factor analysis was used 
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to identify the latent variables that drive the perceptions of the respondents. The large 
number of structural and strategic entry barriers included in our survey provides a 
proper basis to assess the existence of the underlying dimensions. Moreover, it can be 
verified whether strategic barriers are grouped in new latent variables separated from 
structural barriers or that structural and strategic barriers are driven by the same latent 
variable. Finally, a conjoint analysis is carried out to assess the importance of these 
underlying dimensions, i.e. to identify the most (un)attractive market situation and the 
most vigorous entry barriers (factors). This part of the study shows which entry 
barriers really affect entry decisions. In a quasi-experimental setting different profiles 
of markets, containing different sets of entry barriers, were presented to the firms and 
they were asked to rank the attractiveness of those markets.  
 
The next Section starts with a concise overview of the literature on entry barriers. The 
concept is defined and the method to measure the importance of entry barriers is 
discussed in Section 3. Subsequently the findings are discussed. Section 4 presents the 
perceptions of firms regarding existing barriers. The underlying factors are identified 
in Section 5 and Section 6 discusses the results of the conjoint analysis. Section 7 
concludes.  
 
2. Literature review 
 
Two traditions can be distinguished in the literature on entry barriers: the Industrial 
Organization perspective (e.g. Bain, 1956; Stigler, 1968; Von Weizsacker, 1980) and 
the Strategic Management perspective (e.g. Porter 1980, 1985; Singh et al., 1998, 
Robinson et al., 2001).  
 
The first tradition focuses on the industry as the unit of analysis, strives for efficiency 
and identifies harmful barriers for economic development. Various models show how 
entry barriers affect the behaviour of firms and the performance of the industry. 
Basically, two types of barriers are distinguished: structural and strategic barriers to 
entry. The structural barriers stem from market structure characteristics and are 
widely discussed in the tradition of Industrial Organisation. Bain (1956) introduced 
the concept of ‘barriers to new competition’. This concept is based on the assumption 
that competition is key in the operation of industries and that any artificial barrier to 
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competition may reduce the efficient allocation of resources in the industry. Bain 
stressed the importance of structural characteristics that hamper market entry of 
potential competitors: economies of scale, technological advantages, absolute cost 
advantages, etc. According to Bain the resulting competitive forces would determine 
the behavior of firms and market performance. This deterministic approach has been 
criticized within the discipline of Industrial Organisation. By the late 1970s these 
views became known as the ‘The New Industrial Organisation’ (Geroski et al.,1990). 
They stressed the importance of behaviour as a determinant for market performance 
and market structure (in the long run). The approach comes close to the tradition of 
strategic management as behavioural aspects are considered to be key. However, in 
line with the tradition of Industrial Organisation, the unit of analysis is the industry.  
  
The Chicago School (Stigler, 1968) contributed to the debate on barriers to entry by 
stressing the importance of costs asymmetry between incumbents and potential 
entrants: The research should not focus on supernormal profits but on the question 
whether the conditions of entry for the incumbents were less difficult than for the new 
entrants. The importance of this argument becomes clear when the advantages of 
economies of scale are interpreted. According to the Chicago School, scale economies 
do not represent a barrier to entry if they imply penalties for companies operating at 
sub-optimal levels of production. Another approach that stems from this tradition 
focuses on the welfare effects and defines barriers to entry as a difference in cost 
structures which provokes a distortion in the use of economic resources from a social 
point of view. The latter argument is put forward by Von Weizsacker (1980) to justify 
interventionist public policies.  
 
A discussion of the specific properties of these different approaches within the 
Industrial Organisation perspective is beyond the scope of this paper (see e.g. McAfee 
et al., 2004). However, it is important to understand that the different approaches lead 
to different definitions of entry barriers. We conclude that Bain’s perspective has the 
broadest scope that suits our problem under study, while the latter two approaches 
consider additional requirements in order to identify the ‘real’ barriers that hamper the 
efficient allocation of resources in the economy.  
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The second tradition, strategic management, takes the firm as the unit of analysis and 
assesses entry barriers as a resource to create competitive advantage for individual 
firms. This line of thought stresses the importance of strategic barriers. Following the 
Resource Based View (Barney, 1991, p. 99), firms are advised to ‘obtain sustained 
competitive advantages by implementing strategies that exploit their internal 
strengths, through responding to environmental opportunities, while neutralizing 
external threats and avoiding internal weaknesses’. In other words, firms are 
encouraged to develop resources that are difficult to copy or to substitute by 
competitors (Rangone, 1999, Dollinger, 2003). These so-called strategic resources 
form the basis for a sustainable competitive advantage. The upshot is that it is in the 
interest of incumbent firms to develop strategies that reduce the competitive forces in 
the market.  
 
From a resource based perspective entry barriers are considered as resources for 
incumbent firms. Strikingly, from the perspective of Industrial Organization, this 
resource constitutes a potential danger as it may hamper the allocative and dynamic 
efficiency of the industry. The contradictory assessment of the value of barriers to 
entry is related to the unit of analysis and the role competition is expected to play in 
the two traditions. At the firm level it is indeed important to strive for a sustainable 
competitive advantage and to exploit available barriers.  
 
Porter (1980: 9-13) does not define the concept but specifies seven major sources of 
barriers to entry: economies of scale, product differentiation, capital requirements, 
switching costs, access to distribution channels, cost disadvantages independent of 
scale and government policy. Implicitly he uses a broad definition for barriers to entry 
in order to encompass the barriers that result from strategic behaviour. He provides a 
kind of typology of barriers to entry that firms should take into account when their 
competitive strategy is developed. Porter’s specification also shows that structural and 
strategic barriers are related. The barrier may be rooted in the market structure, but 
this will encourage firms to react strategically. For example, advertising can be 
considered as a structural phenomenon in the automobile industry, however, each 
actor may develop its own advertising strategy (brand) that affects new competitors. 
This shows that most structural barriers may have a strategic component too. 
 7 
Therefore, the focus of this article is not only to understand the importance of 
structural and strategic barriers, but also to analyse to what extent the barriers cohere.  
 
The aim of this discussion is not to identify the right tradition. Both approaches may 
be relevant and the proper choice depends on the problem under study. We recall that 
the objective of this research is to identify important entry barriers as perceived by 
firms (Yip, 1982; Karakaya and Stahl, 1989; Singh et al., 1998; Smiley, 1988). The 
unit of analysis is the firm. It aims at recognising the major constraints that hamper 
firms in making their entry decision. Therefore, a broad definition of entry barriers, 
encompassing all relevant associations made by firms, is adopted for this research. 
 
3. Definition of concepts and data collection 
 
A useful definition for this research is found in Besanko et al. (2007, p 289): ‘Barriers 
to entry are those factors that allow incumbent firms to earn positive economic profits, 
while making it unprofitable for newcomers to enter the industry’. Two types of 
barriers are distinguished. Structural barriers concern natural cost or marketing 
advantages resulting from market characteristics that are exogenous to the firm in the 
short and medium-term. Strategic barriers result from a firm’s behaviour and concern 
entry deterring strategies.  
 
As the concepts involved are sometimes difficult to circumscribe in unambiguous 
questions a pilot study has been carried out in November 2004, in which 40 students 
participated. The students tested the survey and were asked to write about 100 case 
studies of the companies they interviewed. The case studies have allowed us to grasp 
the functioning of the perceived barriers to entry in the different industries under 
study and, therefore, have facilitated the interpretation of the results of the 
questionnaire. Moreover, some questions were refined to avoid ambiguous 
interpretations. The final questionnaire was pre-tested by telephone with potential 
respondents. 
 
A large number of structural and strategic barriers to entry were presented in the 
questionnaire (see Annex 1). However, not all the barriers identified in the literature 
study (Blees et al., 2003) were addressed. Time limitations and the results of the 
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abovementioned pilot study explain this selection. The firms were interviewed by 
telephone and previous experiences have shown us that it should not take more than 
15 minutes. More time would affect the willingness to cooperate. Some issues were 
difficult to describe in an unambiguous question (e.g. causal ambiguity). The pilot 
study showed that it was difficult for the respondents to distinguish similar barriers 
(e.g. brand name and customer loyalty are related to advertising; experience 
advantages are part of cost advantages; government regulations are related to 
government licences; know how is related to level of technology and patents).  
 
Some aspects were covered by two separate questions in order to be able to make a 
distinction between the importance of structural and behavioural characteristics of the 
barriers. For example, with regard to advertising we presented two statements: 1. 
Firms in the market have high expenditures for advertising and promotion (structural), 
2. The products are heavily supported by advertisement and promotion in order to 
make entry to the market less attractive for new competitors (strategic). We claim that 
the listed barriers to entry in Annex 1 give an overview of the most important barriers 
discussed in the extant literature.    
 
Incumbent companies were asked to indicate on a five point Likert scale to what 
extent new competitors would encounter the barrier in questionii. Ideally the survey 
should have addressed new and potential competitors with feasible business plansiii. 
It could be argued that the perceptions of incumbents may show some bias as these 
firms have surmounted existing barriers: i.e. knowing how to solve a problem 
makes the problem trivial. However, potential newcomers with feasible business 
plans are difficult to identify for two reasons. Many of these firms are in the 
inception phase and not yet registered formally and, therefore, difficult to trace. 
Even more important is that only viable start-ups should be interviewed, as only the 
opinion of viable firms has to be taken into account. For example, if the bank 
rejects a deficient business plan on solid grounds and refuses a loan application, the 
entrepreneur may indicate that finance is indeed a major barrier, while it would 
have been more appropriate to conclude that the plan was wrong. Therefore we 
preferred to interview incumbents as they have proven to be viable.  
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As we are interested in barriers (potential) entrants may face and not the behaviour 
of the specific incumbents per se, the questions were directed at practices in the 
market rather than the firm’s specific behaviour. In general, the incumbents were 
asked to indicate how important a specific barrier is if a comparable company 
(same size) wants to enter the major product market in which the incumbent is 
operational. As barriers to entry are related to product markets and most firms 
manage multi-product operations, we explicitly referred to the most important 
product market. The advantage of this format for the question is that all companies 
have experience with the market and, therefore, are able to value the importance of 
the specific barrier.  
 
In total 3,562 firms were contacted for the telephone surveyiv. This resulted in 1,074 
completed responses: 663 micro enterprises, 303 small enterprises and 186 medium 
and large enterprises (18 unknown) distributed quite equally over the sectorsv. This 
signifies a response rate of 30%. Of the contacted firms, 33% refused to cooperate. 
Another 24% of the contacted firms could not be reached because of an answering 
machine, get no answer, number engaged or more than 6 attempts with no response. 
Finally, with 13% of the contacted firms an appointment was made but it did not 
result in a completed questionnaire because the targeted sample was reached. Another 
96 respondents were added, as they were interviewed by our students in the pilot 
phase, using an identical question format for the barriers under studyvi. In total the 
sample consists of 1,170 Dutch firms distributed over six industries, i.e. furniture, 
employment agencies, chemical industry, ICT, food (production of bread) and retail 
(clothing and shoes)vii. 
 
The aim was to collect data for approximately 175-200 firms per sector divided over 
three size categories: micro enterprises (< 10 employees), small enterprises (10 to < 
50 employees), and medium and large enterprises (50+ employees). Per size category, 
the firms were selected at random from the Direct Marketing CD-database of 
MarketSelectviii. In some sectors all existing firms were contacted in the size category 
of 50+ employees, because of the limited number of larger firms in those sectors. 
Most observations are in the class of < 10 employees, or micro firms. In the retail 
sector, we only have five observations of firms with 50 employees or more. As the 
sample was drawn from a database including subsidiaries and branches of larger 
 10
firms, and responses were provided by local managers, the questions concern 
employment figures of the selected subsidiary. About 40% of the interviewed 
establishments are related to a larger company.  
 
The MarketSelect database was used to test for non-response bias. Smaller firms were 
more willing to participate in the research than large firms. This holds for the total 
sample as well as for the sectors furniture, employment agencies, chemical industry 
and ICT. No significant differences related to size were found for the food industry 
and retail. In the food industry, firms were less willing to participate in the research 
compared to the other sectors, probably because of the Christmas rush. 
 
For the final part of this study, the conjoint analysis, another group of firms (n = 137) 
has been interviewed by students in November 2006. In the framework of their studies 
they carried out a case study assignment on the entry barriers these firms were facing. 
The conjoint was part of the assignment. As the selected firms cover the 
manufacturing (somewhat under-represented) and services industries (somewhat over-
represented) in the Northern region of the Netherlands it could be posited that some 
bias may have affected the results. However, we expect that this is unlikely as sectoral 
differences are limited and do not affect the ranking of the importance of the different 
entry barriers (Section 4). Moreover, the conjoint concerns a hypothetical market 
situation (Section 6) which excludes sectoral and regional differences. Most important 
for this sample is to make sure that only experienced businessmen are involved. 
 
4. Findings: perceived entry barriers in the firms’ markets 
 
In Table 1 the perceived importance of the barriers in the markets under study is 
presented. Overall, securing input for newcomers, collusion among incumbents, 
access to knowledge for newcomers, retaliation and knowledge protection by 
incumbents are the least important barriers. According to the interviewed firms 
most barriers concern unimportant constraints (value lower than 3)ix. The mean 
score is 2.5 and implies that on average barriers are not perceived as major 
constraints: ‘nearly not’ or ‘somewhat’ important. This can be interpreted as a good 
sign for the Dutch economy. However, some barriers seem to play an important 
role: the required sales volume for entrants, the needed capital and financial risk 
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for newcomers, behaviour with regard to product differentiation by incumbents, 
cost disadvantage and costs of capital for newcomers. 
 
The importance of half of the barriers under study does not differ significantly 
between firms of different size. However, for collusion, knowledge, retaliation, 
switching costs, strategic behaviour related to R&D, government policy, excess 
capacity, economies of scale, and strategic behaviour related to differentiation 
some significant differences are observed between firms of different size (5% 
level). The excess capacity barrier is more important in the perception of medium-
sized and large firms than for micro and small firms. In a market with excess 
capacity, it will be more difficult for a relatively large firm to enter because it 
brings considerable extra capacity to the market. This finding confirms the 
difference that is made in theory between small-scale and large-scale entry. The 
barrier related to collusion is somewhat higher for micro firms. However, we note 
that even the average value of micro firms for the importance of this barrier is low. 
The scores for all other barriers with significant differences between firm size 
classes show that micro firms give lower values than medium and large firms. Even 
the value given by micro enterprises to the most important barrier (sales volume) is 
lower than the value given by medium and large firms. The upshot is that, on 
average, micro firms perceive lower barriers to entry than medium-sized and large 
firms. This is a surprising result as many researchers expect the opposite (see Blees 
et al., 2003). 
 
In general the ranking of the importance of specific barriers to entry coheres between 
the sectors: securing input and collusion are of minor importance for all but two 
sectors (respectively retail and employment agencies), while sales volume and capital 
are most important for all sectors. Overall, the firms value only a few barriers as 
important constraints. Finance and sales volume are key issues in all sectors. 
However, some significant sectoral differences are observed. For instance, securing 
input is relatively important in retailing and knowledge is relatively important in the 
chemical industry (Kemp and Lutz, 2006). The ICT and furniture industry are sectors 
with relatively low barriers, the chemical, retail and food industry show relatively 




Table 1: Perceived barriers to entry 
Barrier to entry Total m,Mean score* ‘Sectoral’ differences**   ‘Scale’ differences*** 
1  Securing input  1.73  f,b>e; f,e,i<c,r; c,b<r; i<b  Ns 
2  Collusion 1.78  f<e,b,r; e>f,c,i,b,r; c<r  MIE>SE, MLE 
3  Knowledge 1.92  f,e,i,b,r<c; e<i,b  MIE<SE, MLE 
4  Retaliation  2.04  f<e,c,b; c,b>i  MIE<MLE  
5  Behaviour knowledge  2.13  f,e,i,b,r < c  Ns 
6  Limit pricing 2.25  e,b>i,r  Ns 
7  Switching costs 2.27  f,e,b,r<c,I;  MIE<SE, MLE 
8  Masking profit 2.28  f<e,b,r  Ns 
9  Behaviour R&D 2.32  f,e,r<c,I; e<b; c>i,b  MIE<SE, MLE 
10 Behaviour advertising 2.39  f,c,i<r; e>i  Ns 
11 Behaviour distribution channel 2.42  f<e,c,i,b; e>f,c,i,b,r  MIE<MLE (P< .10)  
12 Government regulation  2.52  f,e<c,b; f,e,c,b>i; e,c,b>r;  MIE<SE, MLE 
13 Distribution  2.77  f,i,r<b; c>r  Ns 
14 Advertising  2.80  f,c,i,b<r; e>i  Ns 
15 Excess capacity 2.87  f,i,r<b  MIE, SE< MLE 
16 Differentiation  3.03  f,e<c,i,b,r  Ns 
17 Economies of scale 3.15  f>e,i,r; e,I,r<b; c>i  MIE<SE, MLE 
18 Costs of capital  3.24  f,c,i<b,r; e<b  Ns 
19 Cost disadvantage  3.25  f,e,c,i<b; e<c,r; i<r  Ns 
20 Behaviour differentiation 3.33  e,i<b  MIE<MLE 
21 Financial risk  3.50  f,e,i<b,r; c<r; c>i  Ns 
22 Capital  3.53  f,c,b,r>i; f.e,c,<b; e<r  Ns 
23 Sales volume   3.84  e<b (p<.10)  MIE < MLE (P< .10) 
Mean score all barriers 2.52  f<e,c,b,r; i<c,b,r  MIE < MLE 
 
* The reply options were: 1 = not at all, 2 = nearly not, 3 = somewhat, 4 = to a large extent, 5 = to a very large 
extent. 
** Significant p<.05 unless otherwise indicated. f = furniture, e = employment agencies, c = chemical industries, i 
= ict, b = food, r = retail.   
*** significant at p<.05 unless otherwise indicated. MIE = MIcro Enterprises, SE = Small Enterprises, MLE = Medium 
and Large Enterprises, Ns = not significant. 
 
 
5. The underlying dimensions of barriers to entry 
 
The covariance matrix shows that the perceptions regarding several of the entry 
barriers strongly cohere. Therefore a factor analysis is carried out in order to verify 
whether some underlying latent variables drive the firms’ perceptions. The co-
variance matrix is non-singular. Based on the correlation matrix we obtain a KMO 
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value of 0.840, and the Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity is significant at the 0.0005 level. 
This implies that the perceptions with regard to each of the barriers can be explained 
by the other barriers.  
 
The determination of the number of factors is not a straightforward process. 
According to the method used 5, 6 or 7 factors can be distinguishedx. We applied 
Kaiser’s rule stating that each factor should explain at least the average variance. This 
method may lead to an overestimation of the number of factors (Horn, 1965). The 
consequences of overestimation are preferred to the consequences of a method that 
fails to identify separate factors (Fava and Velicer, 1996)xi.  
 
The factor analysis identifies 7 factors that constitute the underlying system and drive 
the perceptions with regard to entry barriers: finance, strategic action, R&D, product 
differentiation, distribution, advertising and government regulations. In total 55% of 
the total variation is explained by these factors. Nearly all entry barriers are strongly 
represented by one of the factors as, in general, the factor loadings are relatively high 
for only one of the identified factors (> . 60). Except for switching costs the 
attribution of a barrier to a specific factor is straightforward. Switching costs cohere 
positively with R&D and negatively with advertising. This indicates that R&D is 
more attractive if switching costs exist. Alternatively, advertising is less necessary if 
switching costs prevail or can’t be created through brand loyalty programs. 
 
Some barriers are weakly represented in several factors: securing input, economies of 
scale and sales volume. In particular sales volume and economies of scale require 
attention as the values given to these barriers were high. It may be argued that these 
high values result from the cumulative effect of several factors (finance, distribution, 
advertising, strategic action, product differentiation). McAfee et al. (2004) called 
these types of barriers ‘ancillary barriers’. They do not constitute a barrier in itself, 
but reinforce other barriers to entry if they are present. Their paper discusses the 
example of economies of scale that reinforces the entry deterrent effects of brand 
loyalty and risk. However, our research results show that the values given to these 
specific entry barriers were generally lower than the importance given to sales 
volume. This indicates that sales volume is perceived as the most important barrier by 
firms as it reflects the cumulative effect of the identified factors. This also shows that, 
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even if the scores for the individual entry barriers are quite acceptable (less than 3), 
the combined effect of the factors can be much stronger: “Because they can interact 
with and magnify each other’s effects, what might seem like a fairly innocuous 
circumstance when regarded individually may be more problematic when the 
presence of other barriers is taken into account” (OECD, 2005, p. 19). 
 
The factors government regulation, finance, and distribution can be considered as 
structural barriers. Three factors encompass strategic and structural elements: R&D, 
product differentiation and advertising. The latter result shows that strategic and 
structural effects cohere. Although the literature stresses the differences between the 
two types of barriers, practice shows that the effectiveness of strategic entry barriers is 
dependent on characteristics of the market structure. Specific structural attributes do 
not drive strategic entry barriers but are a necessary condition for the effectiveness of 
strategic barriers. For example, in a market for bulk products a product differentiation 
strategy is ineffective, but in a market with differentiated products a product 
differentiation strategy is key. The factor strategic action seems to resemble a pure 
strategic barrier. However, even for this factor it is clear that a strategy of excess 
capacity and retaliation can be effective only if the number of competitors is limited. 
This implies that the effectiveness of strategic barriers depends on attributes of the 
market structure. 
 
Remarkably, despite the differences in research setup, some similarities exist with the 
research results of Karakaya. In these studies 3 factors in consumer goods markets 
(Karakaya and Stahl, 1989) and 4 factors in industrial markets (Karakaya, 2002) were 
identified: firm specific advantages, product differentiation, financial requirements or 
costs of market entry and profit expectation of entering firms. The last factor does not 
particularly concern an entry barrier, but rather a set of indicators for market 
attractiveness. The first three factors identified by Karakaya cohere with the factors 
identified in our study as similar entry barriers are driven by the identified underlying 
dimensions. A major new insight is the difference in the number of underlying 
dimensions and the identification of factors like strategic behaviour, R&D and 
government regulations. Having identified the underlying dimensions the question 































1 Costs of capital  3.18 
 1.012  .197  .077  -.023  .061  .096  -.025 
 Capital 3.55 
 .918 -.181  .124  .012  .103  .195  .153 
 Financial risk 3.40 
 .853  .037  .158  .154  .051  .185  .115 
 Cost disadvantage 3.23 
 .758  .191  .068  .138  .038  -.058  .078 
2 Limit pricing 2.15  .209 
 .967 -.053  .093  .072  -.228  .042 
 Behaviour distrib. Channel  1.88  -.046 
 .797  .243 -.009  .532  .372  .043 
 Retaliation 1.71 -.006 
 .712   .213  .185  .014  .193  .347 
 Excess capacity 2.79  .349 
 .708  -.039  .517 -.117 -.150  .106 
 Masking profit 1.97  .060 
 .707  .203  .058  .168  .107 -.109 
 Collusion 1.45  .032 
 .654  .125 -.130 -.019  .251 -.017 
3 Knowledge 1.75  .081 -.010 
 .934  .126  .070  .015  .158 
 Behaviour R&D 2.05  .063  .118 
 .910   .226  .090  -.248  .107 
 Behaviour knowledge 2.03  .053  .205 
 .900 -.014 -.017  .219  .124 
 Switching costs 2.00  .194  .280 
 .699  .214  -.028 -.634 -.266 
4 Differentiation 2.76  .078 -.026  .301 
 .960  .075  .218  .017 
 Behaviour differentiation 3.24  .156  .140  .045 
 .950  .220  .037  .060 
5 Distribution 2.60  .113  .078  .155  .130 1.255  .044  .141 
6 Advertising 2.72  .306  .259  -.019  .174 -.027 
 .703 -.108 
 Behaviour advertising 2.21  .255  .419  .134  .354  .009 
 .646 -.035 
7 Government regulations 2.42  .348  .151  .278  .088  .139  -.098 1.305 
 - Securing input 1.54  .293  .206  .432  -.061  .088  .202 -.122 
 - Economies of scale 3.35  .446  .266  .011  .252  .479 -.326 - .061 
 - Sales volume  3.80  .323  .096 -.032  .153  .316 -.037 - .006 
* Extraction method: Principal component analysis. Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser normalization. 
First a factor analysis was carried out on 2/3 of the sample. The results were compared with a1/3 holdout sample. As 
the results were similar we ran a factor analysis on the entire dataset. In bold the factor loadings are given for the 




6. A conjoint analysis to identify the most important entry barriers  
 
As all barriers are generally present to a smaller or larger degree, it is preferred to 
measure the importance of a specific barrier in combination with the existence of 
other barriers. A full profile conjoint analysis is conducted to test the underlying 
dependence of the entry barriers. Conjoint analysis is commonly used in marketing 
research to analyse consumer trade-offs (Wittink & Cattin, 1989). The last decade 
conjoint analysis is also used as an analytical tool in managerial decision making (see 
e.g. Priem, 1992; Shepherd, 1999; Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2000; McDermoll, 
Lovatt & Koslow, 2004). In full profile conjoint analysis a set of hypothetical 
alternatives is constructed, and each alternative or profile stands for a combination of 
the distinguished attributes. Conjoint analysis is able to derive the importance of each 
attribute (relative weights) from the choices made, between the different profiles, by 
the respondents. The profiles are constructed in a systematic way by using a 
decomposition approach (Churchill, 1999). 
 
In our conjoint analysis, respondents were asked to rank 10 profiles. As the number of 
23 barriers (Section 4) is too large for respondents to fully evaluate the differences 
between the profiles, we used the seven identified underlying dimensions (Section 5) 
in the conjoint analysisxii. The barriers could have the value of 
high/difficult/strong/much versus low/easy/hardly/few (see also Karakaya & Stahl, 
1989). For constructing the profiles we used a factorial design. 
 
The conjoint analysis for the managers was introduced as if a friend was asking for 
advice to start a new business and the context of the business, a market profile, was 
characterised by the seven barriers. In Table 3 the relative importance of the seven 
barriers are presented. The results of the conjoint identify the most attractive market 
profiles and allow us to deduct the most vigorous entry barriers that influence entry 
decisions. Managers find finance by far the most important barrier, followed by 
access to distribution and strategic action of incumbents. Product differentiation is 




Table 3. The importance of the underlying dimensions (relative weights) 
 
 Manager/owner (n = 137)  
Finance 28.7  
Distribution 21.7  
Strategic action 19.0  
R&D 13.5  
Advertising 11.0  
Government regulation 5.1  
Product differentiation 1.0  
 
 
The results of Tables 1 and 3 seem to be somewhat contradictory. Both tables confirm 
the importance of finance. However the role of strategic action and distribution is 
given more importance in Table 3 than in Table 1, while R&D, government 
regulation, advertising and product differentiation are getting lower scores. It is 
important to recall that the results in Table 1 are based on the question “is the specific 
barrier important in your market”, whereas the results in Table 3 are based on the 
question “how attractive is the market profile in which the following set of market 
barriers exist”. The differences between these questions explain the differences in 
results. Table 1 shows the importance of a specific barrier in the market in which the 
firm operates. The scores indicate that in most markets under study the importance of 
these barriers is not worrisome (generally average values below 3). In particular 
financial issues seem to play an important role in existing markets. This finding is 
getting extra significance in Table 3, which shows that manager/owners weigh this 
factor most in markets where these barriers are operational. Table 3 also shows that, 
although strategic action and distribution barriers are not really hampering the firms in 
their markets of operation, they would be perceived as a serious barrier to entry if they 
would exist. At the same time the results show that, even if government regulation 
and product differentiation would constrain the market operations, these barriers will 




In the debate on entry barriers some researchers stress the importance of one of the 
two strands of barriers. Table 3 does provide some support for the ‘structuralists’ 
(finance is a structural and important barrier), but also for the ‘behaviourists’ 
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(strategic action does matter). A factor analysis allowed us to identify the seven 
underlying dimensions that drive the system: finance, strategic action, R&D, product 
differentiation, distribution, advertising, government regulation. A striking result is 
that some structural and strategic barriers cohere: some barriers are rooted in the 
market structure but this seems to encourage firms to react strategically. The 
importance of knowledge, patenting and switching costs, may serve as an interesting 
example. Advertising and product differentiation provide similar examples where 
structural barriers induce strategic actions. We conclude that the effectiveness of 
strategic barriers depends on attributes of market structure. 
 
Based on the seven generic factors, a conjoint analysis was carried out to identify the 
most important factors perceived by firms. The conjoint analysis shows that the 
barriers rooted in three underlying dimensions require attention of market authorities 
as they may refrain new entrants from entry to specific markets: finance, access to 
distribution channels and strategic action. Government regulations, product 
differentiation, R&D and advertising constitute a minor entry problem according to 
the firms.  
 
The results show that in modern entrepreneurial economies market authorities should 
play an important role if specific markets are affected by significant entry barriers. 
Although entry barriers in existing markets in the perception of firms do not seem to 
be very important, it is acknowledged that some barriers may influence entry 
decisions. Consequently, entry barriers can reduce the amount of entrepreneurial 
activity and potential competition. Although it is not a general phenomenon in the 
Dutch economy at large it may constrain competitive forces in specific industries. 
Some authors explained that in the entrepreneurial economy less attention should be 
paid to regulation (Audretch and Thurik, 2001). They observe a trade off between 
‘stimulation versus regulation’. Our findings rather suggest that both policies 
complement each other: ‘stimulation and regulation’ are instruments of policies that 
encourage entrepreneurial activity. In particular strategic action and distribution 
policies in specific sectors may require attention of market authorities. Financial 
barriers are most important in the perception of firms. The latter finding justifies a 
further study of the functioning of the financial market as it may constitute a general 
barrier for entrepreneurial activity. 
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Finally we recall that the importance of barriers is relatively low in the Dutch 
economy. This may be taken as a positive sign and as a support for the view that 
building an entrepreneurial attitude should be paid more attention by policy makers. 
The results are also in line with the conclusion of Geroski (1995): ‘entry is easy but 
survival is not’. This indicates that policy should not focus all its attention on attitudes 
and start-ups but also give priority to maintenance: existing firms. 
 
We conclude with some limitations of the study. Firstly, in Section 3 we discussed 
that only managers of existing companies have been interviewed. These managers are 
already active in the market and, therefore, may underestimate the importance of the 
barriers as discussed in Section 4 and 5. Ideally we should have interviewed persons 
who prepare their entry to the market on the basis of a feasible business plan. They 
are, however, difficult to identify and, therefore, our sample is considered as a second 
best solution. It is noted that this problem did not affect the results in Section 6. The 
conjoint analysis is based on a virtual market situation (profiles) in which prior 
experiences in a specific market are not explicitly taken into account. Secondly, the 
study is limited to a single country and pulls the data of a selected number of 
industries. Extension of the research to other countries would help to determine how 
far these results can be generalized. Finally, we only identified the perceived barriers. 
Studies that relate the perceived barriers to actual entry are needed. This would help 
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Annex 1: Entry Barriers derived from the literature survey and addressed in the survey 
 
Type of barrier Barrier to entry* Source 
Structural  Access to distribution (13) Porter 1980; Yip 1982; Karakaya & Stahl 1989; 
Han et al. 2001 
 Access to knowledge / 
patents (3) 
Yip 1982; Harrigan 1983; Karakaya & Stahl 1989; 
Shepherd 1997 
 Advertising (14) Spence 1980; Harrigan 1981; Yip 1982; Netter 
1983; Schmalensee 1983; Karakaya & Stahl 1989 
 Capital requirements (22) Bain 1956; Porter 1980; Harrigan 1981; Yip 1982; 
Karakaya & Stahl 1989; Shepherd 1997 
 Sales volume (23) Yip 1982 
 Cost disadvantages of 
newcomers (19) 
Bain 1956; Scherer 1970; Yip 1982; Karakaya & 
Stahl 1989; Geroski et al. 1990; Han et al. 2001 
 Costs of capital / special risks 
and uncertainties (18) 
Demsetz 1982; Shepherd 1997 
 Customer switching costs (7) Porter 1980; Klemperer 1987, 1992; Karakaya & 
Stahl 1989; Shepherd 1997; Shy 2002 
 Differentiation (16) Bain 1956; Porter 1980; Schmalensee 1982; 
Karakaya & Stahl 1989; Shepherd 1997; Martin 
2002 
 Economies of scale (17) Bain 1956; Dixit, 1980; Scherer 1970; Spence 
1980; Harrigan 1981; Schmalensee 1981; Yip 
1982; Geroski et al. 1990; 
 Government regulations (12) Porter 1980; Dixit & Kyle 1985; Karakaya & Stahl 
1989; Shepherd 1997 
 Financial risk/sunk costs (21) Bain 1956; Porter 1980; Baumol et al. 1982; 
Geroski et al. 1990; Sutton 1991; Sheperd 1997 
Strategic Limit pricing (6) Bain 1956; Milgrom & Roberts 1982; Geroski et al. 
1990; Bunch & Smiley 1992; Singh et al. 1998 
 Masking profit / gaps and 
asymmetric information (8) 
Milgrom & Roberts 1982; Geroski et al. 1990; 
Bunch & Smiley 1992 
 Retaliation (4) Scherer 1970; Yip 1982; Karakaya & Stahl 1989; 
Bunch & Smiley 1992; Gatignon et al. 1997; 
Shepherd 1997; Thomas 1999  
 Collusion (2) Singh et al. 1998 
 Excess capacity (15) Spence 1977; Dixit 1980; Harrigan 1983; 
Lieberman 1987; Bunch & Smiley 1992; Shepherd 
1997; Singh et al. 1998 
 Securing input / control over 
strategic resources (1) 
Scherer 1970; Yip 1982; Karakaya & Stahl 1989; 
Shepherd 1997; Singh et al. 1998; Cabral 2000 
 Strategic behaviour 
advertising (10) 
Bunch &Smiley 1992; Singh et al. 1998 
 Strategic behaviour 
differentiation / packing the 
product space (20) 
Schmalensee 1978; Bunch & Smiley 1992; 
Shepherd 1997; Cabral 2000  
 Strategic behaviour 
distribution channels (11) 
Singh et al. 1998 
 Strategic behaviour 
knowledge / pre-emptive 
patents (5) 
Bunch & Smiley 1992; Singh et al. 1998 
 Strategic behaviour R&D (9) Harrigan 1981; Yip 1982; Daems & Douma 1985; 
Bunch & Smiley 1992; Singh et al. 1998 






                                                          
i
 These are the views of the authors and need not reflect those of EIM or the NMa. We would like to 
thank all students who participated in the fieldwork and the course ‘Small Business Economics’. Their 
reports, enthusiasm and critical comments were highly appreciated. 
 
ii
 The reply options were: not at all, nearly not, somewhat, to a large extent, to a very large extent (or 
alternatively: strongly disagree, disagree, not agree / not disagree, agree, strongly agree). 
 
iii
 Even the group of new and potential competitors can be considered as too broad. For the research 
information from the ‘marginal entrant’ is needed. This marginal firm is indeed difficult to identify. 
 
iv
 A telephone survey was preferred for the following reasons: generally these surveys have a higher 
response rate and result in a more complete data set (fewer missing values), less time is needed for data 
collection and more control over the stratified sample is possible during the data collection process. 
v
 In total 209 firms belong to the furniture sector, 204 to the employment agency sector, 174 to the 
chemical industry, 215 to the ICT sector, 157 to the food sector, 193 to the retail sector. 
 
vi
 It could be argued that students are not very experienced interviewers. However, we believe that their 
results are reliable as this group was intensively supervised by the researchers. For most barriers, no 
significant differences were found between the data from the telephonic interview and the students’ 
interviews. Therefore, pooling the data is admissible. 
 
vii
 The SBI-code of the Chamber of Commerce for the industries were 361 (furniture), 74501 
(employment agencies), 24 excluding 241 (chemical industry), 721 and 722 (ICT), 158 (food, 
production of bread) and 5242 and 5243 (retail, clothing and shoes). 
 
viii
 The database is based on information on business registrations by the Chambers of Commerce, 
address information by TNT Post and checks by MarketSelect. 
 
ix
 The scores have the same range as previous research, see e.g. Smiley (1988) and Karakaya (2002). 
 
x
 Interestingly, the results are quite robust if the number of factors is reduced to 6 or 5. The first 5 
factors are identified in all these models and in general the same variables are getting high factor 
loadings. The advertising barriers are identified in a separate factor in the 6 factor model while these 
variables get a relatively high factor loading in the capital and strategic action factor if a 5 factor model 
is estimated. In the 5 and 6 factor model government regulation gets a high loading in the factor access 
to distribution channels. The advantage of the 7 factor model is that it leads to an unambiguous 
interpretation. It allows for a distinctive role of advertising. The same applies for government 
regulation. In the other models it would be difficult to interpret its meaning in connection with access 
to distribution channels.   
 
xi
  First a factor analysis was carried out on 2/3 of the sample. The results were compared with a 1/3 
holdout sample. As the results were similar we ran a factor analysis on the entire dataset. 
xii
 For example, one of the profiles consisted of the following market characteristics: (1) high 
expenditures on advertisement are necessary, (2) it is difficult to access distribution channels or 
customers, (3) much capital is needed for entry, (4) few government entry regulations apply, (5) hardly 
any product differentiation exists, (6) high expenditures for R&D are needed, (7) incumbents hardly 
react to entry.  
